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Managing America: Elections

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Week Ending September 7, 2007

H.R.811 To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper ballot under title III of such Act, and for other purposes.

The concern over the certification of votes has been simmering since the vote recounts that decided the 200 presidential elections in favor of George Bush. This bill is the latest effort to avoid a similar predicament.

Voting systems are required to produce an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voter’s vote that will be created and made available for inspection by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and counted. Such a ballot will include a paper ballot marked by the voter to be hand counted or read by a scanner, a paper ballot prepared by the voter to be mailed in, a ballot created by a ballot marking device or system or a paper ballot produced by a touch screen or other electronic voting machine as long as the voter can verify the ballot before the vote is finally cast.

If the voter sees an error the opportunity to correct that error most be provided before the vote is cast. The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible to associate the voter with the vote but the paper ballot will be used for any audit or recount legally required. If there is a discrepancy between the electronic total and the paper ballot total, the paper ballot total will prevail as the official count.

State law will prevail if it is shown that the paper ballots have been compromised to the extent that the result of the election could be changed but the electronic tally will not be used as the exclusive basis for determining the official certified vote tally.

The bill provides that at least on voting machine equipped for disabled voters be made available at each polling place. The Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology is directed to implement a $3 million study, test and develop best practices to enhance the accessibility of ballot verification mechanisms for individuals with disabilities, for voters whose primary language is not English and voters with literacy problems. Grants are to be made available for the testing and studies must be completed by December 31, 2008. Trade secrets of machines studied will be protected. Testing facilities must not have a conflict of interest typified by an income related to testing the machines from another source than the account the Commission uses to pay for the testing. The testers must not have a financial interest in the manufacture, sale and distribution of voting system software and must be sufficiently independent from other persons with that interest.

Testing labs, after qualifying will be picked at random and their identity will be revealed publicly after the testing is complete. If a labs certification is revoked or restored or security is breached, Congress and the public must be notified promptly.

No fewer than three eligible entities will be awarded grants to conduct research on the development of election-dedicated voting system software. The grant total is $1.5 million yearly for 2007 and 2008.

Technological Protections

No voting system shall contain, use or be accessible by any wireless, power-line or concealed communication device except that enclosed in infrared communications devices which are certified for use by the State and cannot be used for any remote or wide area communications or used without the knowledge of poll workers present.

No component of any voting device upon which ballots are programmed or votes are cast or tabulated shall be connected to the Internet at any time.

Machines can not be used unless the manufacturer documents the secure chain of custody for the handling of all software, hardware, vote storage media, ballots and voter-verified ballots used in connection with the voting system and shall make that information available upon request to the Election Commission. After the Commission certifies the system software for use the manufacturer may not alter the software or insert or use in the voting system any software not certified by the State.

By August 2008 the Commission shall develop and make public best practices regarding chain of custody.

Ballots

The ballots shall be marked printed or recorded on durable paper meaning it must be capable of withstanding multiple counts and recounts by hand without compromising the fundamental integrity of the ballots and must be capable of retaining the information on them for a period of 22 months.

The ballot information must be readable by the voter without assistance other than eyeglasses or other vision devices. Voters will be offered the ballot and the supplies necessary to mark the ballot. The waiting period to cast the vote is not to be greater that the waiting period for an individual who rejects using the paper ballot.

Paper ballots will not be considered provisional ballots unless the voter would have otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot.

After Vote Audits

States are required to administer audits of Federal election results without advanced notice to the precincts selected for the audit. The audits will include random hand counts of the paper ballots. If a candidate had no opponent or received 80% or more of the vote, not audit is required. No final certification of the election results can be made until the audits are completed. Federal funds will finance the State audits.

Sponsor:  Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ-12^th)

Vote: Scheduled for floor action. Not yet considered.

Cost to the taxpayers: Such sums as may be necessary are authorized.

Earmark Certification:   Not applicable to this bill.

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