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Week Ending September 27, 2006
H.R.3127 To impose sanctions against individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, to support measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations, and to support peace efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan, and for other purposes.
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The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, Africa involves the murder, maiming and dislocation of many western Sudanese and has become increasingly more intense since 2000. The situation is further complicated by a northern Muslim / southern Christian, civil war that has gone on for the better part of fifty years.
Sudan is rich in oil and natural gas reserves as is neighboring Chad.
Early on the Bush administration dealt on a diplomatic basis directly with the civil war aspects and saw some progress towards peace but the Darfur crisis that had been developing since the late 1990s did not seem to be of much concern until Columnist Nick Kristof of the New York Times began an intensive campaign of public awareness. In the mean time things were becoming more critical in the Darfur region.
The UN became actively involved the country as did physicians and other aid givers from France. Ultimately Congress recognized the murder in Darfur as genocide after Secretary of State Colin Powell visited the country and saw the travesties there.
In December 2005 the Senate passed, the House agreed to and the President signed a bill providing $200 million for peace efforts there and another $100 million for the President to distribute once a north / south peace agreement was established. A plan was hatched and carried out that would bring a leader of the southern Sudanese into the northern government in Khartoum. The plan has had mixed reviews but the civil war waned a bit for a while. Later in July 2005 the Senate passed a Resolution supporting the UN mission there. Also in July 2005 the House passed a Resolution calling for prayer over the crisis.
The President released in July 2005 a $6 million drawdown of military goods to help transport African Union troops to Sudan (African Union troops are akin to UN troops in that they are an umbrella peacekeeping force on the continent.). Prior to the July drawdown, in November 2005, the President continued the view that Sudan is a threat to US national security and foreign policy.
This current excursion into Sudan’s cultural and political problems begins with the President’s authorization to freeze assets of and deny US visas to any individual responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity in Sudan. Assets transferred after July 1, 2002 to family members of those complicit in the genocide and other crimes would also be frozen. The President can waive those actions if he believes it is in the US national interest. He is further urged to impose sanctions on Janjaweed members and officers. The Janjaweed is the militia doing the murdering and is believed to be supported by the Khartoum government.
The President is authorized to assist and reinforce deployment and operations of the African Union mission there and to advocate to NATO the reinforcement of African Union troops. The bill also authorizes the President to take steps to deny Sudan government access to oil revenues in at least one way that would deny entry to US ports by Sudan oil tankers or cargo ships trading with the Sudan military if the government of Sudan does not take specific measures towards peace, allow for the safe return of refugees and allow humanitarian assistance into Darfur. Further, countries that do not adhere to a UN sanctioned embargo of military assistance to Sudan could face the President’s decision to cut US assistance to them. The President is directed to instruct the US UN representative to push a Security Council resolution supporting expanding the African Union mission in Sudan.
All sanctions and other such activities will continue until Sudan is acting in good faith to resolve the Darfur crisis, disarm and disband the Janjaweed and the Lords Resistance Army (Christian army in the south), and adhere to UN resolutions. Sudan must fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement without delay.
The bill also provides for Malaria control assistance, a program coupled with AIDS and tuberculosis-fighting assistance
Sponsor: Rep. Henry J Hyde (R-IL-6th)
Vote: Passed House 416 to 3 (RC 90) April 5, 2006. Amended in Senate by Unanimous Consent. Passed House amended by voice vote September 25, 2006.
Cost to the taxpayers: “CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 3127 would not have a significant impact on the Federal budget.”
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MORE INFORMATION
BACKGROUND OF THE LEGISLATION
The Darfur region of western Sudan is home to at least 36 tribes identified within two major groups: Arabs and non-Arabs (the latter known as `Zurga' or indigenous Africans). 1
[Footnote] Both groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim, and years of intermarriage have made racial distinction difficult. Over the years, desertification and competition over scarce resources has triggered sporadic armed conflict between the largely nomadic Arab herders and sedentary African pastoralists. Successive governments in Khartoum exacerbated these tensions by manipulating ethnic divisions and arming tribes of Arab descent to act as proxy forces in the region. This strategy is markedly similar to that which has been pursued by the Government of Sudan (GoS) in Southern Sudan, where over 21 years of war left two million dead and nearly four million displaced.
[Footnote 1: International Crisis Group (ICG), `Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis,' 25 March 2004.]
Citing ethnic, political, and economic marginalization of non-Arabs in Darfur, two rebel groups emerged in February 2003: The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The SLA is composed mainly by the non-Arab Fur, Zaghawa, and Masaalit tribes. It is speculated that the SLA has received support from fellow Zaghawa in Chad and Libya, Darfurian businessmen in the Persian Gulf, and from the Government of Eritrea. The SLA also received early support from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan. 2
[Footnote] The JEM is dominated by the Zaghawa and is alleged to have links to Dr. Hassan al Turabi, founder of the National Islamic Front (NIF), former Speaker of Sudan's National Assembly, and potential threat to President Omar Bashir. 3
[Footnote]
[Footnote 2: Ibid, page 20.]
[Footnote 3: Ibid.]
The GoS has dismissed the SLA and JEM as terrorists and claims the conflict is tribal in nature. However, observers consistently assert that the conflict has far more to do with political and economic marginalization--and a war between the center of power and the periphery--than it does with traditional tribal rivalries. Khartoum's concerns over threats emanating from the West reportedly were exacerbated in March 2003, when the SLA joined the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), an umbrella group of southern rebels and northern opponents of the regime in Khartoum.
With the NIF regime in Khartoum weakened by internal turmoil and distracted by mounting international pressure to resolve the North-South conflict, which already had lasted over two decades and claimed more than two million lives, the SLA and JEM exacted a string of victories throughout the spring of 2003. By mid-2003, the GoS had significantly increased its presence in Darfur by arming government-supported militias, collectively known as Janjaweed, and by deploying the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). The Janjaweed, under the direction of regular government forces, unleashed a campaign of terror against civilians reportedly in an effort to forcefully expel non-Arab ethnic groups. 4
[Footnote] In mid-February 2004, President Bashir declared that the security forces had crushed the SLA and JEM. Despite this claim, the conflict continues.
[Footnote 4: United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHO). Report of UNCHO Mission to Chad, April 2004.]
According to officials from the United States Government and the United Nations (UN), the situation in the Darfur region of western Sudan continues to be one of the greatest humanitarian crises in the world. Out of an estimated pre-conflict population of seven million in Darfur, anywhere between 180,000 and 400,000 already have died and over two million have been displaced. 5
[Footnote] Reports by refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) detail a systematic pattern of attacks against civilians by the Janjaweed, who have employed scorched earth tactics backed by air and land strikes by GoS forces. Entire villages have been razed, crops burned, and wells and irrigation systems destroyed. There are widespread reports of arbitrary killings, abductions, looting, torture, and rape.
[Footnote 5: Reports on the numbers of deaths resulting both directly by violence and indirectly by disease and malnutrition vary widely. The United Nations reports 180,000 deaths, while groups such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ) place the figure between 300,000 and 400,000.]
On April 2, 2004, UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland characterized the situation in Darfur as `ethnic cleansing.' 6
[Footnote] On April 7, 2004, during a speech reflecting upon the Rwandan genocide before the UN Commission on Human Rights, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that reports from the region had left him with `a deep sense of foreboding,' and asserted, `The international community must be prepared to take swift and appropriate action.' 7
[Footnote]
[Footnote 6: See UN, `Press Briefing on Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur, Sudan,' 2 April 2004.]
[Footnote 7: See UN, `Secretary-General's Address to the Commission on Human Rights (As Delivered),' 7 April 2004.]
The United States Congress declared that the atrocities in Darfur constitute genocide with the passage of H. Con. Res. 467 and S. Con. Res. 133 on July 22, 2004. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 2004, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell affirmed the position of Congress and publicly acknowledged that genocide had occurred in Darfur and may still be occurring. On September 9, 2004, the State Department released a report which concluded that the GoS `promoted systematic killings based on race and ethnic origin,' and that these acts constitute genocide. The report, and the Administration's subsequent determination of genocide, drew upon information collected by an `Atrocities Documentation Team,' which conducted 1,136 interviews of Sudanese refugees in August of 2004.
Initially, the African Union (AU) was slow to respond to the crisis in Darfur. In late March 2004, the AU sent a team to participate in ceasefire negotiations between the GoS, the SLA, and the JEM in Chad. Under the terms of the April 2004 N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement, the AU was tasked with creating a Ceasefire Commission and subsequently deployed ceasefire monitors under the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The deployment of AMIS, albeit small, took more than four months after the signing of the agreement. In late September 2004, the GoS and the AU finally agreed to expand AMIS, several weeks after the UN Security Council endorsed such an expansion and threatened sanctions if the GoS failed to cooperate. In May 2005, the AU announced that AMIS would expand to 7,700 personnel. With assistance provided by the United States, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, deployment of these additional troops began in July 2005. Currently, there are over 6,000 African Union forces and monitors on the ground in Darfur.
Though forces and observers deployed under AMIS have performed well to date, the limited size and mandate of the AU mission, as well as logistical and financial troubles of the organization, have severely hampered the work of AMIS in Darfur. The mission is dependent upon funding and logistical support from donors--particularly the United States and the European Union--who have given generously but now face difficulty in sustaining contributions. Further, the mandate does not provide for civilian protection and contains no enforcement mechanisms, aside from reporting the violations to a Joint Commission. Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement and the deployment of AMIS, there have been countless violations by all parties with no apparent consequences.
These constraints have prompted discussion of a United Nations takeover of AMIS. The United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador John Bolton, used the occasion of the United States' presidency of the Security Council during February 2006 to press for a resolution formally authorizing the `re-hatting' of AMIS. On February 3, 2005, a Statement by the President of the Security Council was issued which authorized the Secretary-General `to initiate contingency planning without delay . . . on a range of options for a possible transition from AMIS to a United Nations operation.' A draft resolution then was circulated by the United States delegation to formalize the proposed UN takeover of AMIS, but was stalled by other Council Members who insisted that the African Union must first make a formal request for AMIS to be taken over by a UN mission, and that the Sudanese Government would have to agree to any such proposal in advance.
To date, the United Nations has approved six United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to the situation in Darfur. Pursuant to UNSCR 1564 of September 18, 2004, an International Commission of Inquiry was created to investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws in Darfur. While the report of the Commission of Inquiry, which was submitted to the UN Secretary General on January 25, 2005, effectively dodged the question of genocide, it did assert, `the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law,' and that Sudanese officials and other individuals may have acted with `genocidal intent.' The report also noted that a sealed file containing information on individuals responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity had been delivered to the Secretary-General for the purposes of possible future prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). By UNSCR 1593 (March 31, 2005), the UN formally referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC.
On March 29, 2005, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1591, extending the military embargo established pursuant to UNSCR 1556 (July 30, 2004) to all the parties to the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement, calling for an asset freeze and travel ban against those who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are responsible for offensive military over-flights or violate the military embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security Council and a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring compliance with UNSCRs 1556 and 1591. Though a list of names of such violators has been submitted to the Security Council, the UN has yet to impose any sanctions.
The inability of the United Nations to enforce resolutions of the Security Council calling for sanctions against Sudan, and the apparent inability to get a resolution passed which would immediately enable the United Nations to take over the AMIS mission in Darfur, largely is attributed to China and Russia--two permanent Members of the Security Council with veto power which have significant interests at stake in Sudan. The GoS also reportedly has begun a diplomatic campaign to persuade other nations to oppose any peacekeeping mission in Sudan other than AMIS.
On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya, ostensibly ending 21 years of civil war between the government in the North and rebels in the South. Pursuant to the CPA, a Government of National Unity (GONU) has been formed in Khartoum which includes both members of the former National Congress Party-controlled government and members of the SPLM. Simultaneously, a regional government was formed in Southern Sudan which has been tasked with preparing the region for a referendum on the question of independence.
Though it was hoped that the conclusion of the CPA would contribute to a political settlement in Darfur, such a resolution remains elusive and the crisis continues. Thus, the United States Government currently faces at least two critical challenges in Sudan: the confrontation of genocide in Darfur and the consolidation of peace in Southern Sudan. Already, the formation of this new Government of National Unity has prompted Sudan watchers to reconsider the appropriateness of imposing new sanctions against the Government of Sudan in general, versus imposing sanctions against individual perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. In addition, the United States Government now must consider lifting, modifying, or waiving existing sanctions against Sudan in an effort to contribute to reconstruction and recovery efforts in Southern Sudan without inadvertently rewarding members of a genocidal government in Khartoum. Thus, while H.R. 3127 specifically is intended to promote peace and accountability in Darfur, it also attempts to address several of the challenges presented by conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and formation of the Government of National Unity.
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, accompanied by Reps. Payne, Smith of New Jersey, Lantos, Royce, Tancredo, Wolf, Jackson-Lee and Capuano, introduced H.R. 3127 on June 30, 2005. The substitute amendment, which was ordered adopted and favorably reported by the Committee on March 8, 2006, represents the product of eight months of bipartisan negotiations among Members from the House and Senate, with significant input from the Administration, academics, non-governmental organizations, advocacy groups, and other concerned groups. The United States Senate passed a similar bill, S. 1462, on November 18, 2005.
CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives and the Senate declared that the atrocities occurring in the Darfur region of Sudan are genocide.
(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, `genocide has been committed in Darfur,' and `the Government of Sudan and the [Janjaweed] bear responsibility--and genocide may still be occurring'.
(3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush affirmed the Secretary of State's finding and stated,`[a]t this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are genocide'.
(4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1556, calling upon the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and establishing a ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types, including the provision of related technical training or assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed.
(5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564, determining that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1556, calling for a military flight ban in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for verification, establishing an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, and threatening sanctions should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1564, including such actions as to affect Sudan's petroleum sector or individual members of the Government of Sudan.
(6) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General on January 25, 2005, established that the `Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law,' that `these acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity,' and that Sudanese officials and other individuals may have acted with `genocidal intent'.
(7) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur further notes that, pursuant to its mandate and in the course of its work, the Commission had collected information relating to individual perpetrators of acts constituting `violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes' and that a sealed file containing the names of those individual perpetrators had been delivered to the United Nations Secretary-General.
(8) On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1590, establishing the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), consisting of up to 10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police tasked with supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and `closely and continuously liais[ing] and coordinat[ing] at all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur'.
(9) On March 29, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1591, extending the military embargo established by Security Council Resolution 1556 to all the parties to the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur, calling for an asset freeze and travel ban against those individuals who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are responsible for offensive military overflights, or violate the military embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security Council and a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591.
(10) On March 31, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the Court.
(11) In remarks before the G-8 Summit on June 30, 2005, President Bush reconfirmed that `the violence in Darfur is clearly genocide' and `the human cost is beyond calculation'.
(12) On July 30, 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the newly appointed Vice President of Sudan and the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) for the past 21 years, was killed in a tragic helicopter crash in southern Sudan, sparking riots in Khartoum and challenging the commitment of all Sudanese to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.
(13) Since 1993, the Secretary of State has determined that the Republic of Sudan is a country which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism and, pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, designated Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, thereby restricting United States assistance, defense exports and sales, and financial and other transactions with the Government of Sudan.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan is characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-led faction of the Government of Sudan;
(2) the Secretary of State should designate the Janjaweed militia as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act;
(3) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have continued to violate the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, and violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and personnel of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is increasing;
(4) the African Union should rapidly expand the size and amend the mandate of the African Union Mission in Sudan to authorize such action as may be necessary to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, and deter violence in the Darfur region without delay;
(5) the international community, including the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and the United States, should immediately act to mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial resources to support the expansion of the African Union Mission in Sudan so that it achieves the size, strength, and capacity necessary for protecting civilians and humanitarian operations, and ending the continued violence in the Darfur region;
(6) if an expanded and reinforced African Union Mission in Sudan fails to stop genocide in the Darfur region, the international community should take additional, dispositive measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in the Darfur region;
(7) acting under Article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for suspension of the Government of Sudan's rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region;
(8) the President should use all necessary and appropriate diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the responsibilities of the Committee of the United Nations Security Council and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to section 3(a) of Security Council Resolution 1591 (March 29, 2005);
(9) the United States should not provide assistance to the Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, the support of the regional Government of Southern Sudan and marginalized areas in northern Sudan (including the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja), Darfur, and Nubia), as well as marginalized peoples in and around Khartoum, or for humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
(10) the President should seek to assist members of the Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a student loan forgiveness program for those individuals who commit to return to southern Sudan for a period of not less than five years for the purpose of contributing professional skills needed for the reconstruction of southern Sudan;
(11) the President should appoint a Presidential Envoy for Sudan with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to provide stewardship of efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, seek ways to bring stability and peace to the Darfur region, address instability elsewhere in Sudan and northern Uganda, and pursue a truly comprehensive peace throughout the region;
(12) to achieve the goals specified in paragraph (10) and to further promote human rights and civil liberties, build democracy, and strengthen civil society, the Presidential Envoy for Sudan should be empowered to promote and encourage the exchange of individuals pursuant to educational and cultural programs, including programs funded by the Government of the United States;
(13) the international community should strongly condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and demand that all armed groups in the Darfur region, including the forces of the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and all other armed groups refrain from such attacks;
(14) the United States should fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and urge rapid implementation of its terms; and
(15) the new leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) should--
(A) seek to transform the SPLM into an inclusive, transparent, and democratic body;
(B) reaffirm the commitment of the SPLM to bringing peace not only to southern Sudan, but also to the Darfur region, eastern Sudan, and northern Uganda; and
(C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine the SPLM
Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.
Section 1 contains a short title and a table of contents.
Section 2. Definitions.
Section 2 updates the definition of the Government of Sudan (GoS), while clarifying that sanctions previously imposed against `officials of the Government of Sudan' will not apply to individuals who were not party to the government prior to July 1, 2005, or to the regional Government of Southern Sudan.
Unlike the Sudan Peace Act of 2002 or the Comprehensive Peace Act of 2004, the focus of sanctions in this bill is not on the Government of Sudan in general, but on individuals who are responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, regardless of their affiliation. This shift was necessitated by the fact that since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, the Government of Sudan now includes members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and other opposition groups who are not necessarily associated with the former government's genocidal acts. Thus, the Committee sought to avoid punishing the new coalition government across the board, and alternatively focused on individual accountability.
Section 3. Findings.
Section 3 provides updates on developments in the country and actions taken by the United Nations with regard to the crisis in Darfur, including the passage of six Security Council Resolutions, the submission of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the referral of the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the death of Dr. John Garang, Vice President of Sudan and leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and the 1993 determination by the Secretary of State that Sudan is a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Section 4. Sense of Congress.
Section 4 expresses the sense of Congress that:
ÌThe Secretary of State should designate the Janjaweed militia as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
ÌAll parties to the conflict in Darfur continue to violate the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and attacks against aid workers and AU personnel are increasing;
ÌThe African Union (AU) should rapidly expand the size and amend the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), to authorize such action as may be necessary to protect civilians and deter violence in Darfur;
ÌThe international community, including the UN, EU, and NATO, should immediately mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial resources to support an expanded AU mission and consider additional measures should the expanded AU mission fail to stop genocide in Darfur;
ÌThe GoS's membership in the UN should be suspended until such time as the GoS has honored pledges to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs;
ÌThe United States should not provide any assistance to the GoS, other than for implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, for marginalized areas, or for humanitarian purposes, until the GoS has honored the pledges described above;
ÌThe UN should impose sanctions against Sudan pursuant to UNSCR 1591;
ÌThe President should establish a student loan forgiveness program for members of the Sudanese Diaspora in the United States who commit to return to Southern Sudan for at least five years so they may contribute to reconstruction efforts;
ÌThe President should appoint a Special Envoy for Sudan and northern Uganda;
ÌThe international community should strongly condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and AU monitors in Sudan;
ÌThe United States should support and urge rapid implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan;
ÌThe SPLM should transform itself into an inclusive, transparent, and democratic political body and reconfirm its commitment to seek peace in Southern Sudan, Darfur, eastern Sudan, and northern Uganda.
Section 5. Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.
Section 5(a) amends Section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 to block the assets and restrict the travel of any individual whom the President has determined is responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in the Darfur region. As the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act currently only imposes sanctions against senior officials in the government, this section reflects the Committee's resolve to hold individuals accountable for genocidal acts rather than punishing the new coalition government in general.
Section 5(b) provides a national interest waiver for the imposition of sanctions against such individuals, provided that the President notifies Congress in advance.
Section 5(c) calls on the President to immediately consider imposing sanctions against Janjaweed commanders and coordinators identified by the former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes during an Africa Subcommittee hearing on June 24, 2004.
Section 6. Additional Authorities to Deter and Suppress Genocide in Darfur.
Section 6(a) amends the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act to authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provide assistance, in consultation with Congress, to reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded AU mission in Darfur with the mandate, size, strength, and capacity to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, stabilize Darfur, and deter air attacks directed against civilians and humanitarian operations. The Committee notes that the President already has committed significant resources toward this end, including by providing more than $190 million to date to support AMIS (not including the costs associated with air transport of AMIS personnel from Rwanda and Nigeria or additional funds which shall be made available following Congressional approval of an emergency supplemental budget request for Fiscal Year 2006) and pressing for greater UN and NATO involvement. Therefore, the Committee asserts that this language is consistent with current United States policy and only strengthens the President's ability to take quick and decisive action to support AMIS, particularly in preparation for an eventual takeover of the mission by the United Nations.
Section 6(b) recommends that the US Permanent Representative to NATO use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at NATO to advocate for NATO reinforcement of the AU mission, upon the request of the AU. Again, the Committee notes that the President and the US Permanent Representative to NATO already have undertaken to encourage greater NATO support for AMIS, but notes that much more could be done to help bridge the gap in capabilities while the United Nations prepares for an eventual takeover of the AMIS mission.
Section 6(c) asserts that the President should take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny the GoS access to oil revenues, including by prohibiting access to United States ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or trade activities in Sudan's oil sector or arms industry, until such time as the GoS honors commitments to cease attacks on civilians, disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refuges and IDPs. This language is consistent with long-standing efforts to prevent the Government of Sudan from financing genocide with oil revenues. However, the Committee does not intend to punish the regional government of Sudan--which is entitled to a 50% share of oil revenues generated in the region--or to inadvertently undermine implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thus, an exemption specifically has been provided for cargo ships or oil tankers involved in internationally-recognized demobilization programs or deliveries of non-lethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Section 6(d) prohibits the provision of non-humanitarian U.S. assistance to countries which violate the military and arms embargo imposed pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591. This language is intended to encourage governments, particularly those of neighboring countries which have a stake in the conflict, to behave responsibly, adhere to UN resolutions, and cut off the seemingly endless supply of weapons being provided to both to the Government of Sudan and to the rebel movements in Darfur.
Section 7. Multilateral Efforts.
Section 7 directs the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN to use the voice, vote and influence of the United States at the UN to urge the adoption of a resolution which supports the expansion of AMIS, reinforces efforts to negotiate peace talks, calls upon all parties to honor obligations under the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement, demands an end to attacks against civilians and humanitarian operations; imposes sanctions against the GoS; and expands the military embargo imposed pursuant to UNSCRs 1556 and 1591 to include all arms transactions other that for use in an internationally recognized demobilization program or for non-lethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The Committee recognizes that the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Bolton, has pressed for greater UN action with regard to Darfur but has been met with strong opposition from other Member States. Such resistance became particularly evident during February 2006, as Ambassador Bolton attempted to use the occasion of the United States' presidency of the Security Council to push for a resolution which would authorize a United Nations peacekeeping mission to take over for AMIS in Darfur. The Committee encourages the U.S. Permanent Representative to continue to pursue these efforts, particularly with regard to the imposition of sanctions and the introduction of UN peacekeepers, despite opposition from other Members of the Security Council.
Section 8. Continuation of Restrictions.
Section 8 prohibits the lifting of restrictions against the GoS imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13067, title III and sections 508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Act of 2006, or any similar provision of law, until the President can certify that the GoS is acting in good faith to: (1) peacefully resolve the crisis in Darfur; (2) disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed and associated militias; (3) adhere to UN Security Council Resolutions; (4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern Sudan; (5) cooperate with efforts to disarm, demobilize and deny safe haven the Lord's Resistance Army; and (6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan without manipulation or delay. This section includes a national interest waiver.
While sympathetic to the challenges which the existing sanctions regime against Sudan presents to the Administration, particularly as the United States seeks to provide greater support for reconstruction and recovery efforts in Southern Sudan, there is a strong, bipartisan consensus among Committee Members that it would be inappropriate to lift sanctions across the board and thereby `reward' a genocidal government and a state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, while legislative relief from existing sanctions may be forthcoming, the Committee asserts that such relief would be carefully considered and targeted in nature.
Section 9. Assistance Efforts in Sudan.
Section 9 amends the International Malaria Control Act to authorize the President to provide assistance to Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei, provided that Congress is notified pursuant to Section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This section further amends the Malaria Act to expand existing exceptions to prohibitions imposed against Sudan pursuant to Executive or 13067 to include `such activities or related transactions' that would directly benefit the economic recovery and development of Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei.
The Malaria Act currently authorizes the President to provide certain forms of assistance to areas of Sudan `outside the control of the Government of Sudan.' However, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and subsequent formation of the Government of National Unity, all parts of Sudan presumably are `under the control of the Government.' Thus, this language provides a specific exemption from the sanctions for Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas. Further, it expands the existing exemption for exports from areas formerly defined as being `outside the control of the Government' to include both imports to and exports from Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas.
Section 10. Reports.
Section 10 amends the reporting requirements in the Sudan Peace Act of 2002 to include sections on U.S. and NATO efforts to support the deployment of an expanded AU mission in Darfur, the performance of AMIS in Darfur, and the status of the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act. Cognizant of the fact that the U.S. Department of State already is overburdened with onerous and often overlapping reporting requirements, the Committee has opted to incorporate these new requirements within existing annual reports, rather than mandating the issuance of entirely new reports.
Section 11. Rule of Construction.
Section 11 provides that nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt State laws which prohibit investment of State pension funds in Sudan.
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