HR3159AUG3

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PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

The purpose of H.R. 3159, Ensuring Military Readiness Through Stability and Predictability Deployment Policy Act of 2007, is to establish a statutory requirement that ensures regular (active) component units and members assigned to those units are provided a minimum period of rest and recuperation that is equal to or longer than the period of the most recent deployment, and a minimum period of rest and recuperation that is at least three times longer than the period of deployment for reserve (National Guard and Reserves) component units and members assigned to those units.

The bill also includes a sense of Congress that the ratio between the length of deployments and dwell time, the interval between deployments, for regular components should be one year deployed to two years at home station (a ratio of 1:2), and the goal for the reserve components should be one year deployed to five years at home station (a ratio of 1:5).

The Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, recently announced a change to deployment policy on May 9, 2007, which would extend the current policy for all active Army units from a 1:1 ratio (one year deployed and one year at home station) to a policy of 15 months deployed and 12 months back at home station. This policy change has raised serious concerns about sustainability, and whether such a reduced period at home station allows sufficient time for units and individuals to adequately train, equip, and re-constitute for the next deployment. The services are currently at a 1:1 ratio for regular components and a 1:3 ratio for reserve components and are not able to meet the Department of Defense goal of a 1:2 ratio for regular components and a 1:5 ratio for reserve components given the current operational requirements.

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DISSENTING VIEWS

We believe that achieving the DOD deployment-to-dwell-time goals for both active and reserve component units and personnel is an important readiness objective that Congress should pursue aggressively. The goal for the regular/active components is one year deployed to two years at home station (1:2); and the goal for the National Guard and other reserve components is one year mobilized to five years demobilized (1:5). Congress can most effectively assist in achieving those goals by committing the resources necessary to substantially increase force structure and manpower and to reset and modernize the military services. Furthermore, if Congress is serious about improving unit readiness and the service members' quality of life by the use of deployment and dwell time measures, Congress ought to ensure that they are achieved across the force, not just imposed on those forces and people deploying to Iraq. We were disappointed that the House Armed Services Committee, in a largely party-line vote, defeated a proposal to reaffirm the achievement of force-wide dwell-time goals and to have the Department of Defense provide Congress with its plan to achieve those goals.

We have grave concerns about H.R. 3159 as amended--the bill the committee approved in a largely party-line vote. We will continue to oppose it for a number of reasons.

The bill would prohibit the deployment of active and reserve component units that did not meet certain minimum stand-down or `dwell time' requirements between deployments. Such prohibitions intrude heavily and inappropriately into the constitutional duties of the President as Commander in Chief.

Beyond that, the dwell time requirements appear to be not so much efforts to improve the readiness of units and quality of life of members in the Armed Forces, but rather to force a withdrawal and reduction of U.S. forces committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom. This is so because H.R. 3159 as amended levies deployment prohibitions only on forces destined for Iraq that did not meet certain dwell time minimums but would allow those very same forces, regardless of dwell time, to be committed to combat in Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world they are needed. For the most highly deployed units, like the Army's 10th Mountain Division, the Iraq-only limitation raises the false expectation among service members and their families that there will be a reduction in deployment tempo--but does nothing to reduce the likelihood of deployments to Afghanistan or other operational hot-spots.

Moreover, we are concerned that by statutorily reducing the pool of forces available for deployment in the midst of a war--essentially putting brigades and battalions on the shelf, so to speak--H.R. 3159 as amended would make substantial reductions in the forces available to meet combatant commander requirements. For example, the Marine Corps told the committee that the deployment prohibitions would prevent the deployment in fiscal year 2008 of eight Marine Corps battalion/squadron sized combat-support and combat service support units that are essential to the support of the Marine Corps' basic war fighting unit--the Marine-Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF); one Marine infantry battalion landing team; and one Marine reinforced helicopter squadron.

H.R. 3159 as amended, which mandates that both units and individuals assigned to them meet minimum dwell times between deployments, would significantly hamper the ability of the Army and Marine Corps, especially, to meet the combatant commanders' requirements. For example, because 55,800 Marines (32 percent of the active duty strength of the Marine Corps) already have at least one deployment, they would not be available for assignment to units deploying to Iraq. In the case of an Army unit, say for example a brigade combat team, that has less than a 1:1 deployment-to-dwell-time ratio, but nearly all its 3,500 assigned personnel meet or exceed the mandated dwell time standard, the brigade could not deploy because of the mandated dwell time limit established for units.

In claiming to improve the readiness and quality of life for certain portions of the Armed Forces, H.R. 3159 as amended ignores the likelihood that its mandates actually would degrade readiness, extend some unit deployments, create further stress and increase the risk to the force. In response to committee questions about the impact of mandated dwell time and deployment restrictions, the Marine Corps, for example, outlined negative impacts created by such mandates:

In order to support OIF requirements during FY08 and comply with the minimum period between deployments proposed [by provisions like the Sen. Webb amendment and H.R. 3159 as amended--a 1:1 ratio] the Marine Corps would have to adjust force generation plans. . . . These plan adjustments could include extending unit deployments, creating provisional units and forcing units to execute missions as in-lieu-of forces. Each of these adjustments, among others, incurs higher risk than that associated with deploying the unit at [a deployment to dwell time ratio of] 7:6 and will create additional force generation challenges for a greater number of units in order to support subsequent OIF rotations.

The supporters of H.R. 3159 as amended quickly dismissed those concerns, citing the ability of the President to waive any limitations imposed by the bill if he could certify to Congress that a deployment was necessary to meet a threat to the national security interests of the United States. Their argument was that such a waiver would be easy to obtain, if not automatic, and would therefore not interfere with the orderly planning and deployment of units and individuals to Iraq.

We think that argument is disingenuous at best. Supporters of H.R. 3159 cannot have it both ways. Either the legislation does nothing significant or it significantly limits deployment decisions. If the former, it is a sham. If the latter, it has all the deficits previously illustrated.

Congress puts Presidential waiver requirements into legislation with the expectation that waivers will be used sparingly and will serve as a barrier to Executive Branch action. The military services understand this and normally would draw up plans and operations without the expectation of obtaining a Presidential waiver. Not surprisingly, supporters of H.R. 3159 as amended defeated Rep. Marshall's amendment to make obtaining a Presidential waiver easier.

For these reasons, we will continue to oppose H.R. 3159 as amended and urge all our colleagues to do so.
Duncan Hunter.
Jim Saxton.
John M. McHugh.
Howard P. `Buck' McKeon.
J. Randy Forbes.
Joe Wilson.
Rob Bishop.
Jim Marshall.
John Kline.
Candice S. Miller.
Phil Gingrey.
Trent Franks.
Bill Shuster.
Thelma Drake.
K. Michael Conaway.

DISSENTING VIEWS

Our men and women in uniform are the best in the world and they deserve all the support and encouragement that we can possibly give them. Our troops on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countless places around the world, are making us proud by their daily sacrifice and constant efforts to protect our great nation.

Unfortunately, the Democrats have decided to make the rest and recuperation of our troops into another tactic in their misguided attempt to precipitously end the war in Iraq. H.R. 3159, which we voted against in committee, is simply another empty partisan attack on the war in Iraq. It shows once again that the Democrats don't actually have a strategy in Iraq, but rather simply want to give up and pull out as fast as possible.

This bill focuses its dwell time requirements solely on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) while ignoring the fact that our ongoing fight against terrorism is requiring our men and women in uniform to put in long deployments, in harm's way, in many places other than just Iraq. Rather than reaffirm the goals for dwell time laid out by Defense Secretary Gates for the whole military and all missions, this bill mandates dwell times for OIF in a backhanded effort to force us to withdraw from Iraq.

The goal of this bill is obviously to force our commanders on the ground to retreat out of Iraq, because they would not have enough troops to maintain the current op-tempo. Unfortunately, if this bill were to become law, it would hurt the troops currently deployed more than anyone else--by extending their tours until troops in the U.S. had met these newly imposed regulations on dwell time. The DOD does have goals for dwell time for all units, as reinforced by Ms. Drake's substitute amendment, but in times of war, the Commander-in-Chief must be able to use the military as is necessary.

Having opposed this bill in committee, we will also oppose this bill on the floor of the House, as it does nothing but harm to our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.
W. Todd Akin.
Joe Wilson.
Tom Cole.
Trent Franks.

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